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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce and explain the conceptual role played by the de
Finetti’s representation theorem (henceforth dFRT) in the modern theory of statistical
inference. dFRT had a strange destiny. Published first by Bruno de Finetti (Innsbruck,
1906 - Roma, 1985) in an paper in French language, it was rediscovered years later after
translation into English [1]. It has been recognized as a fundamental result for Bayesian
Statistics and interpreted as a kind of justification for the subjective interpretation of
probability. For many reasons dFRT does not find a place in undergraduate Statistics
textbooks. First, undergraduate Statistics textbooks follow mainly the frequentist approach
with Bayesian methods relegated (if lucky) in one final chapter close to the appendix.
Second, dFRT involves some mathematical technicalities that are not easily accessible to
undergraduates. Third, and perhaps most important, dFRT has a conceptual relevance
rather than practical one and this makes it usually more compelling for philosophers than
for statisticians. It has to be properly interpreted, i.e. to assign it a meaning, that properly
locates it conceptually inside the theoretical framework of modern inferential statistics. The
usual interpretation of dFRT stressed its role both as a formal justification of the “degrees
of belief” school of Probability theory and as a link between the latter and the frequentist
School [14]. Due to its borderline and foundational role, dFRT has been approached with
deference and awe in some technical presentation. On the other hand, the scope and
power of this theorem is usually under-represented in popular Statistics expositions or
introductory textbooks. In what follows I will re-explore and clarify the meaning of the
dFRT, stressing its pivotal role in particular in the induction process that was also the crux
and motivation behind de Finetti efforts concentrated in its theorem [1].
1.1 Independence and prediction: some clarifications
In life there are no difficult things to understand, everything depends on the path we follow
on the way to reach the truth and clarify the terms used. For a full understanding of
dFRT its important to review some basics facts about inferential statistics [3, 4, 5]. In
what follows I will use the term induction as a synonymous of being able to probabilistically
infer about future outcomes looking at the past relative frequencies. At the outset some
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important clarification are in order. The bad thing of Statistics is that sometimes topics
are presented in a way that mathematical formalism covers the concepts behind them so
that the main point is not easy to be grasped by the novice. The good thing is that
in Statistics we can explain a lot of things with the use of a very common and simple
object: the coin. Nonetheless its simplicity and ubiquity, the coin tossing model has some
important disadvantages and can lead to serious misunderstandings. The limitation is that
when we consider a (even not fair) coin, we are adopting an underlying independent and
identically distributed assumption (IID henceforth) that is quite strong but that makes life
very easy for the inferential exercise. But this does not represent the whole story. What
if, for whatever reason, the tossing are not independent? What if they are not identically
distributed1? Will we be able in these condition for example to predict the next toss given
the past results?
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) (1)
Is induction possible in this case? Here is where the dFRT shows all its power since it
clarify at least conceptually what we can and what we cannot do and know about induction
in the the dangerous lands outside the safe IID enclosure. An important clarification has
to be stated at the outset:
1This is not an exotic possibility even in a simple coin tossing experiment. With some practice, after
many tosses, a person can become able to affect the outcome for example introducing a bias in favor of head.
The probability of getting head can thus change during the experiment, invalidating the IID assumption.
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Statement n. 1 Independence alone in general is not enough for induction, since
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) = p(xn+1) (2)
so this prevents the possibility to learn from the past. But if other than indepen-
dent our random variables are also identically distributed, the IID case, then we
can learn from the past using the relative frequency of the occurrence of the event
of interest. This fact is usually given for granted in a first year undergraduate
statistics course. As I will show below, the theoretical rationale behind this is
another core result springing from the dFRT.
2 inferential statistics: a bird’s eye view
The usual “statistical inference” tale follows some traditional steps: a) we are interested
in a natural phenomenon that can be properly described by a given random variable;
b) it follows that the outcome of a possible experiment regarding the phenomenon can be
described by an appropriate statistical model; c) a parametric statistical modelM is defined
in terms of the parametric family of densities that depend on one or more parameters θi; d)
we observe data {x1, . . . , xn} as a particular realization of the random sample {X1, . . . , Xn};
e) we use the sample to infer the value of the parameter(s); f) we use the fully specified
model for prediction of future realization of the event of interest. The exact way in which
this recipe is put into practice depends on the paradigm adopted. We know that in life
matters rarely can be separated strictly in black and white, there is always a fuzzy shade
of gray. This is also true for this long standing debate about the conflict frequentist versus
Bayesian. By and large the main line of fracture lies in the way each group interpret
probability statements and how this is reflected in the approach to statistical inference.
Here a brief sketch of the two main schools of thought.
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2.1 frequentist approach
In this approach, probability is the long-run frequency of te occurrence of an event and
parameters in the statistical models are considered fixed but unknown quantities. In any
statistical problem, we have data that are generally sampled from some population or
data generating process that is repeatable. Probability statements cannot be made about
parameters because they cannot meaningfully be considered as repeatable. The main as-
sumption used here is that observation are independent and identically distributed (IID)
because when this is the case the statistical model of the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn)
can be simplified tremendously by factorization:
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏
i
p(xi, θ). (3)
Notice that in the formula above I put a comma between the sample value xi and the
parameter θ because for the frequentist a parameter is indeed just a parameter: a constant
whose value is unknown. Any assumption about the term p(x1, . . . , xn) appearing in (3),
the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn), is one of the fundamental starting points of the
inferential process and at the same time the entry point for a full understanding of dFRT.
2.2 The Bayesian approach
For the Bayesian parameters are not just parameters in the above sense but random vari-
ables, something that in the mind of the researcher can assume different values with different
probabilities attached to them. As any random variable, the parameter θ is specified by a
distribution or a density called prior pi(θ) that is based on the state of knowledge that the
subject interested in the random experiment possesses about the parameters; it is here that
the concept of degree of belief enters into the picture: the prior is a (not necessarily sub-
jective) idea about the possible values of the parameter that can be different for different
subject according to the different knowledge that they possess about the data-generating
mechanism of event of interest. pi(θ) is the terrible probability of a probability, a concept
that frequentists simply abhor. It is not important from where the prior comes from, what
is important for the Bayesian framework is how we “update”our knowledge by combining
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the prior and the information collected by a random experiment in the form of a set of
data. This is given formally by the famous Bayes formula:
p(θ|x1, . . . xn) = p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)
p(x1, . . . xn)
=
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)∫ 1
0
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)dθ
. (4)
The denominator of the previous formula is the again the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn).
Here p(x1, . . . xn) is called marginal distribution because it does not depend on the param-
eter since it has been marginalized out by integration:
p(x1, . . . xn) =
∫ 1
0
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)dθ. (5)
This equality can be easily derived by assuming that
∫ 1
0
p(θ|x1, . . . xn) = 1, a fact that makes
sense only in the head of Bayesians since θ is a random variable. the term p(x1, . . . xn|θ)
appearing on the right side of (4) is the so called Likelihood function, another hotshot of
the whole inferential statistics narrative. Furthermore, even Bayesians adopt a concept of
independence to simplify the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn) but now this assumes the
following form of conditional independence:
Figure 1: The Bayesian cycle for prediction.
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p(x1, . . . , xn|θ) =
∏
i
p(xi|θ). (6)
In this case we have to put a bar | in the above formula to stress than we are conditioning
given the value of the random variable Θ = θ. There is a huge conceptual gap between
formula (6) and formula (3) reflecting the fracture that opposes frequentist and Bayesian
in the way they look at the inferential process.
Something at this point must be clear to the reader. Inference for the frequentist means
to find an approximate value of the (unknown) constant θ using the collected sample
(x1, . . . , xn) at hand. Inference for the Bayesian means to improve his initial knowledge
about the distribution of the parameter. Both will use their findings about θ to use the
statistical model for prediction of future events. This will be a recurrent theme if what
follows. The issue of trying to predict the future using the past information is a crux for
both frequentists and Bayesian and will be stressed again below since is a key ingredient
in the elucidation of dFRT. Inferences about the parameter θ uses (4). What we need is to
specify the prior and this of course is a subjective ingredient. For the Bernoulli case, the
Bayesian machinery uses the Beta distribution:
pi(θ) = Beta(θ, a, b) =
Γ(a+ b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)
θa−1(1− θ)b−1, for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (7)
This combined with the likelihood function generate the posterior according to Bayes
rule (4). Different choice of the parameters a and b will generate different classes of priors.
In figure (2) the initial prior (green line) is the uniform density generated with the choice
a = 1 and b = 1. The black curve refers to the density of a the Beta(47,55), representing
the posterior in the case of fair coin tossing.
3 To the de Finetti’s representation theorem
The starting point to the dFRT is different and lies in the more general concept of ex-
changeability instead of independence. Informally this means that given the set of sampled
observations {xi}i=1...n, the order of these observations does not matter. This applies in
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the case of usual understanding of multiple tosses of a coin. The “coin tossing\number of
heads” experiment is modeled via the random variable:
X(E) =
 1 E = {Head}0 E = {Tail} (8)
The observed list of outcomes, for example {0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0}, are expected to be exchange-
able since the probability of this sequence does not change if we change the order of digits.
What seems relevant here is not the order but the numbers of 1’s. Exchangeability expresses
a kind symmetry of beliefs about the random quantities in which the future observation
are expected to be similar to past observation [17, 13, 2, 8]. The next, is a very important:
Statement n. 2 The condition of exchangeability is weaker than independence
but it is stronger than the identically distributed property. It can be easily proven
that IID random variables are exchangeable.
There are many situations in which this assumption is reasonable like in the coin toss-
Figure 2: From a uniform prior (horizontal line) and after 100 tosses of a fair coin where
#H ∼ #T . The resulting posterior is a Beta.
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ing experiment, and others where is not true or questionable. Consider the following
example. A football player who is practicing to score in a penalty: The sequence scored
penalties FAIL, FAIL, FAIL,GOAL,GOAL has presumably a higher probability than
GOAL,GOAL,FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, because the player accuracy improves with practice
so we can expect the future will be different from the past. For the mathematician taste,
here I give a more formal definition of exchangeability:
Definition. A set of random variable {Xn} is said to be exchangeable if, given the joint
density p(x1, . . . , xn), we have
p(x1, . . . , xn) = p(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) (9)
for all permutations σ of 1, ..., n.
If, like in the example of the IID coin toss, we are in presence of exchangeability, this has
important conceptual consequences in terms of predictive inference. Being exchangeable
means that the past is similar to the future and this symmetry can be translated saying
that knowing the past is telling us something about the future and helps to predict the
future. As already mentioned, this is strictly related to the problem of predictive inference,
that is to estimate:
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) (10)
Equipped with the concept of an exchangeable sequence we can now state the dFRT
for Bernoulli distributed random variables. Various forms of extension and generalization
of exchangeability and de Finetti result can be found in literature. The interested reader
can refer to [6, 7, 10].
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Theorem (De Finetti, 1930). let {Xi}∞i=1 be a sequence of finitely exchangeable
random variables i.e. ∀n > 0 each finite sub-sequence {Xi}ni=1 is exchangeable.
Then there exists a random variable Θ and a distribution function F (θ) such that:
p
(
lim
n→∞
∑
Xi
n
= Θ
)
= 1 with Θ ∼ F (θ) (11)
and
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
[∏
i
θxi(1− θ)1−xi
]
dF (θ) (12)
A detailed proof can be found in Chapter 4 of [3] or in [9]. Here I will try to motivate
the relevance of dFRT with some examples. First let me clarify some points. As previously
mentioned, the main ingredient of inferential statistics is given by the hypotheses over
the structure joint probability distribution p(x1, . . . , xn). The dFRT tells us that under
exchangeability (not necessarily IID) the correct form of this joint probability is given by
(12). F (θ) in (11) is sometimes referred to as the mixing distribution of the exchangeable
random variable. dF (θ) can be thought of as equivalent to pi(θ)dθ (in the sense of the
Stieltjes integral) when F (θ) is continuous ([16] chapter 10 p 524). This said, (12) becomes:
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
[∏
i
θxi(1− θ)1−xi
]
pi(θ)dθ (13)
where pi(θ) is what is usually interpreted as the density function of the prior over Θ.
Another important point of the theorem rests primarily on the existence result (11). it
assures the existence of a random variable that encapsulate the maximum possible knowl-
edge about the underlying data-generating mechanism that produces data. we defined in
(11) such that any finite subset of {Xi}∞i=1 can be considered as a random sample of the
model
{
θ
∑
xi(1− θ)n−∑ xi}. Another point usually stressed since the first de Finetti philo-
sophical interpretation is that dFRT justifies the use of a probability distribution over the
parameter Θ = p(X = 1). The (11) is extremely important. It is in fact a Law of Large
Numbers for exchangeable random variables, a very important result embedded inside the
dFRT. Under exchangeability condition the relative frequency
∑
Xi/n tends to a random
10
variable, not necessarily “degenerate” (i.e. constant with probability one) as in the IID
classical Large Number Law case. Summarizing, the condition of exchangeability implies:
 There exists a random variable Θ such that:
P(x1, . . . , xn|Θ = θ) = θk(1− θ)n−k;
 Θ is the limit of the relative frequencies: this is the the more general Law of Large
Numbers for exchangeable random variables and
F (θ) = lim
n→∞
P
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ θ
)
 if F has density, dF (θ) = pi(θ)dθ where pi(θ) is the density of Θ. Before observing
the data, any hypotheses about pi(θ) (right or wrong that it can be) corresponds to
the prior: it is the idea about the underlying structure of the parameter Θ before the
data are collected;
Combining dFRT and Bayes rule, and after some calculus “gymnastic”, it is possible
to show that:
Figure 3: dFRT: the overall picture.
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p(xn+1 = 1|x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
θpi(Θ|x1, . . . , xn)dθ = E (pi(Θ|x1, . . . , xn)) . (14)
This means that, after the posterior is obtained, the best prediction about a future
observation is the expected value of the posterior (figure 3).
It is clear now how much dFRT is important for the problem of induction. Before
observing the sample {xn+1 = 1|x1, . . . , xn}, there is an idea about the distribution of Θ
that corresponds to an idea about its density pi(θ). This is strictly related the the un-
derlying data-generating mechanism that describe the structure of the joint distribution
p(x1, . . . , xn). The idea about pi(θ) can be more or less “close” to the correct, real, distri-
bution of θ, but after observing the data, something important happens for the possibility
of the induction process (i.e. making probabilistic statements about the future using ob-
servation from the past):
Statement n. 3 Given the exchangeability hypotheses, and whatever is the
observer’s idea about the prior density pi(θ), the induction about the probability
of the next observation of the event of interest given the data, will be strongly
“guided” by the relative frequency of the observed event of interest.
In what follows I will motivate it with some examples where I will stress how the theorem
helps to solve the theoretical problem of induction.
3.1 Case I: {Xi}∞i=1 IID.
In this case, since {Xi}ni=1 are IID, by the law of large numbers we have that ∑Xin converges
to a degenerate random variable Θ, that is a random variable for winch there exist one
value θ such that P (Θ = θ0) = 1 and such that E(Xi) = θ0. This case is equivalent to say
that (in what follows we assume k =
∑
xi):
p(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) = θ
k
0(1− θ0)n−k (15)
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Figure 4: Distribution of
∑n
i Xi/n in the case p(
∑
Xi = k) =
(
n
x
)
(0.5)n(0.5)n−k for different
values of n. From the left to the right n = 5, 20, 100. It clearly shows that the limit
distribution is equal to degenerate case with θ0 = 0.5
.
This is a quit special situation. In general things are more complicated as I will mention
below. In this case Θ does not have a density but, according to the discussion in (??),
we can still manage the integral (12) “as if” it’s density is represented by a Dirac delta
function (for a “refresh” of its properties, see appendix A):
pi(θ) = δ(θ − θ0) (16)
and the corresponding step CDF:
F (x) =
∫ x
−∞
δ(θ − θ0)dθ. (17)
In this case we have:
∫ {
θk(1− θ)n−k} δ(θ − θ0)dθ = θk0(1− θ0)n−k, (18)
where the natural choice for approximating θ0 is
θˆ0 =
k
n
(19)
This is the case where frequentist and Bayesan meet.
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Figure 5: Distribution of
∑n
i Xi/n in the case p(
∑
Xi = k) =
1
n+1
for different values of
n. From the left to the right n = 5, 20, 100. It clearly shows that the limit distribution is
equal to θ
3.2 Case II: {Xi}∞i=1 exchangeable but not independent.
A very instructive example due to Bayes himself ([15], p.29). Let’s imagine that we have a
sequence of Bernoulli random variable (X1, X2, . . . ) such that
p
(
n∑
i
Xi = k
)
=
1
n+ 1
, fork = 1 . . . n. (20)
In this case {Xi}∞i=1 are exchangeable, they are identically distributed since p(Xi = 1) =∫ 1
0
θdF but they are not independent since for example p(X2|X1) 6= p(X2). dFRT applies,
so we can specify the joint probability using (12). Since {Xi}∞i=1 are not IID the dFRT
tells us that
∑n
i Xi/n still converges to a random variable whose “structure” is now more
complicated than the degenerate case saw in the classical IID example above. It can be
easily shown analytically that F (θ) = θ. This is equivalent to say that the prior pi(θ) = 1,
i.e θ has a uniform distribution in (0, 1). Here I will motivate this intuitively with the help
of some software computation. Figure (3.2) shows the distribution function of
∑n
i Xi/n for
our random variables at different values of n. It clearly shows what happen if n becomes
large.
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3.3 The general case.
In general the possible structure of p(Sn = k) for the binary case is limited because of the
constrain of the probability properties. The previous cases are only particular situations
and in general it is possible to show that the formula for the general form of p(Sn = k) is
given by:
p(Sn = k) =
(
n
k
)∫ 1
0
θk(1− θ)n−kΓ
(
b
c
)
Γ
(
r
c
)
Γ
(
b
c
+ r
c
) dθ, (21)
where Γ stands for the Gamma function, n is the number of successes over the total n and
and a, b, r, c are suitable parameters. The (21) is called Po´lya urn model (for more details
the reader can refer to [11]). It follows that:
lim
n→∞
∑
Xi
n
= Θ ∼
∫ θ
0
1
B
(
b
c
, r
c
)u bc−1(1− u) rc−1du (22)
3.4 An “extreme” case
Let’s now consider the situation depicted in figure (6). Given Xi ∼Bernoulli(θ), such that
p(Xi) = θ and:
p(Xn+1 = 1|Xn = 1) = 1 and p(Xn+1 = 0|Xn = 0) = 1 (23)
{Xi}∞i=1 are exchangeable and satisfy the dFRT conditions, the relative frequency can direct
successfully the induction process.
Figure 6: An “extreme” case of exchangeable RV.
15
4 What if {Xi}∞i=1 are not exchangeable?
Let’s try to summarize the story so far. dFRT is an important theoretical tool since it can
shed light on the meaning and role of the prior in the whole Bayesian cycle. It shows how
the IID case represents just one among many different possibilities about the distribution
over the parameter of interest θ. It is important to stress that if we are interested in a
predictive exercise:
p(xn+1|x1, . . . xn), (24)
even if initial hypotheses about the joint distribution differ, after the data they tend to
“’converge”. This is clearly shown in the following example.
Given Xi, before the data:
 IID assumption: p(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
25
= 1
1024
 Uniform prior assumption: p(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
2772
given the data: 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0
 IID assumption: p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
2
 after updating the uniform: p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
2
This is a well known fact in Statistical practice: irrespective of the idea about the prior,
different posterior will tend to be close to each other after data are collected (figure 7) .
In particular the expected value of the posterior will be close to the relative frequency and
so it will be the prediction about the probability of the next observation of an event. So
the relative frequency plays an important role but this is true only if we are in presence of
exchangeable random variables. If they lack this property, relative frequency is no longer
able to “direct” the induction process. I will show this with the following example.
Given Xi ∼Bernoulli(θ), such that
p(Xn+1 = 1|Xn = 0) = 1 and p(Xn+1 = 0|Xn = 1) = 1 (25)
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Figure 7: Different opinions about θ will converge, with the expected value close to the
relative frequency.
The evolution with non zero probability are depicted in (8). Xi are not exchangeable and
induction fails since the relative frequency now is not a guide to the estimation of the under-
lying mechanism that produced the data. Indeed for example p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
and not the value suggested using the relative frequency that is 1/2 in this case.
Summarizing: if a sequence of random variable exchangeable, the relative frequency of
data leads to a proper evaluation of the predictive probability. If the random variables are
not exchangeable, the relative frequency will not guide to a proper inferential conclusion.
This is the case where the Bayes inferential machinery (4) goes haywire. This can be
synthesize in the following final:
Figure 8: A case of not exchangeable RV.
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Statement n. 4 If Xi are not exchangeable, the relative frequency is no longer
able to direct the induction process to a proper conclusions.
5 The moral of the story
Frequentist and Bayesian inference are usually pictured as irreconcilable paradigms in
Statistics and the main difference between the two (parameters fixed versus parameters
as random variables) often stressed as a the fracture between the two visions. The de
Finetti’s representation theorem is usually introduced in the context of Bayesian inference
and it is considered to play a role in the “justification” of the prior distribution of the
parameter of interest. In this expository work I tried to challenge this view with an under-
standing of the theorem that stresses its role at the frontline between Probability Theory
and Inferential Statistics, and its relation to the very problem of relating past observations
with future predictions. To conclude, a list of the main key-points:
 exchangeability is the key property for induction;
 the use of relative frequencies for prediction during the induction process makes sense
only in the presence of exchangeability;
 de Finetti’s theorem clarify the role played by the relative frequency in the Bayesian
framework;
 the IID case is a particular case;
 for non-exchangeable random variables, relative frequencies will fail to guide the
induction process;
 the theorem can be extended to arbitrary real-valued exchangeable sequences [6].
Finite version and generalizations can be found in [7]. Further generalizations in [10].
“This [theorem] is one of the most beautiful and important results in modern
statistics. Beautiful, because it is so general and yet so simple[12]”
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Appendix A Dirac delta
It is obvious that probability density is definite only for absolute continuous variables.
However, in some “pathological” situation can be useful to extend the concept of density.
The figure 4 below depicts the posterior shapes (described by Betas distribution) for differ-
ent valises of n. The when N increases the base of the bell-shaped density will be narrower
and narrower and the top higher and higher. For N very big we can imagine that the
density will tend to something with an infinitesimally narrow base whereas the height goes
to infinity. The limit density when N → ∞ is not a “traditional” density but an exotic
mathematical object called a Dirac delta generalized distribution. The Dirac delta - also
called generalized function is usually indicated as δ(θ−θ0) and formally it can be described
as follows:
δ(θ − θ0) =
 0 θ 6= θ0∞ θ = θ0 (26)
with the property that
∫
R
δ(x)dx = 1 (27)
The delta function is not a distribution, technically it is not even a mathematical
function. Instead it can make sense to use it inside integrals in operation involving limits
of sequences of normalized (integral= 1) functions behaving like the Beta in (A). If we
have a sequence of such functions δn(x) it holds that:
lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)δn(x− x0)dx = f(x0) (28)
It should be emphasize that the integral on the left-hand side of is not a Riemann
integral but a limit. It can be treated as a Stieltjes integral if desired. δ(x)dx is replaced
by dH(x), where dH(x) is the Heaviside step function.
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